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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SARA-ANN P. FEARON, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-23556 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
Respondent, 
- and -
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY 
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Employer. 
SHELLMAN D. JOHNSON, for Charging Party 
JAMES R. SANDNER, GENERAL COUNSEL (MARIA ELENA GONZALEZ, of 
counsel), for Respondent 
DALE C. KUTZBACH (MICHELE A. BAPTISTE, of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Sara-Ann P. Fearon to a decision 
of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing her improper practice charge which 
alleged that the United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO (UFT) violated 
§209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it refused to take 
a grievance she had filed to step three of the grievance procedure.1 Fearon's employer, 
1
 On February 3, 2003, Fearon attempted to amend the charge, filed on July 18, 2002, 
to include an allegation that UFT failed to respond to a letter she sent dated July 4, 
2002. The proposed amendment was denied as untimely. Fearon moved to amend the 
charge again at the hearing, and the ALJ denied the motion on timeliness grounds. 
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\ the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York (District), was 
made a statutory party to the proceeding.2 
Hearings were held on October 28 and 30, 2003. At the close of Fearon's direct 
case, UFT made a motion to dismiss the charge for failure to present a prima facie 
case. The ALJ denied the motion and UFT presented its case. The ALJ, in her decision, 
— reversedthat ruling,_grantedJhe_motion„and„dismiss_ed_the_charge, 
EXCEPTIONS 
Fearon excepts to the ALJ's holdings, arguing that the ALJ erred in granting the 
motion to dismiss, in dismissing the charge and in finding that a proffered amendment to 
the charge was untimely. The District supports the ALJ's decision; UFT has not 
responded.3 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the dismissal of the charge by the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The facts are fully set forth in the ALJ's decision4 and are repeated here only as 
necessary to address Fearon's exceptions. 
Fearon alleges in the charge that UFT refused to take her grievance to a step 3 
grievance hearing. Under the UFT-District collective bargaining agreement, only UFT, 
not an individual unit member, may proceed to step 3. Fearon also alleges that UFT 
2
 Act, §209-a.3.The charge, as amended, alleged that the District had violated §209-
a.1(a) of the Act. Those allegations were deemed deficient by the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) and were not processed. 
3
 On September 27, 2004, we received Fearon's reply to the District's response to 
Fearon's exceptions. The reply has not been considered by us as we neither requested 
J nor authorized its filing. Rules, §213.3. 
4
 37 PERB 1J4558 (2004). 
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failed to contact her in the course of making its decision and failed to provide her with 
the reasons upon which its denial was based. 
During her direct case, Fearon presented evidence that she had sought UFT's 
assistance with the grievance, had received the step 2 decision by the District and 
sought to have the grievance taken to step 3 by UFT. She testified that she received a 
.. letterirom_UFT advising_herJhat,„afterserious and thoroughmnsideration,ihe 
grievance would not be pursued. She was invited to call UFT to discuss the decision 
and advised of UFT's internal appeal procedure. Fearon neither called UFT nor 
appealed UFT's decision internally. 
DISCUSSION 
We affirm the ALJ's denial of Fearon's motion to amend the charge to include the 
allegation that UFT failed to respond to Fearon's July 4, 2002 letter. Improper practice 
charges must be filed within four months5 of when the charging party knew or should 
have known of the acts alleged to be violative of the Act.6 Here, Fearon knew or should 
have known well before October 3, 2002, four months before her first attempt to amend 
her charge, that UFT had not responded to her July 4, 2002 letter. 
With respect to UFT's motion to dismiss at the close of Fearon's direct case, as 
the ALJ correctly noted, in evaluating a motion to dismiss, the truth of all the charging 
party's evidence must be assumed and the charging party given every reasonable 
inference that may be drawn from that evidence.7 The ALJ further made clear that the 
5
 Rules, §204.1(a). 
6
 Buffalo Teachers Fed'n, Inc., 29 PERB1J3006 (1996); New York City Transit Auth., 28 
PERB 1J3070 (1995). 
7
 County of Nassau (Police Dep't), 17 PERB P013 (1984). 
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standard for deciding an allegation that the duty of fair representation is breached by a 
union's failure or refusal to provide the reasons for its decision to pursue a grievance 
was clarified by our decision in Transport Workers Union, Local 100,8 issued 
subsequent to the hearing in this case, but prior to the issuance of the ALJ's decision. In 
that case, we held that a charging party must produce evidence to prove the necessary 
__-_eleme.nis_of_axhargeJhata_union^^^ 
discrimination or bad faith,9 and the mere failure or refusal to set forth the reasons for a 
union's failure to take an action requested by a unit member, without such evidence, 
does not establish a violation of §209-a.2(c) of the Act. In determining whether Fearon 
had introduced sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case in order to decide the 
motion to dismiss made at the close of Fearon's case, the ALJ properly concluded in 
x her decision that, because Fearon had presented no evidence of arbitrary, 
discriminatory or bad faith conduct by UFT, the motion to dismiss must be granted. 
Fearon raises in her exceptions the ALJ's reversal of her decision to deny the motion to 
dismiss and argues that it was error. 
We agree that, procedurally, the ALJ could not reverse her decision to deny the 
motion to dismiss on her own motion, without a motion to reconsider her prior ruling 
made by a party to the case, without notice to the parties. However, since the issue has 
been raised on appeal, we may review the ALJ's decision on the motion. We find that 
the ALJ should have granted the motion to dismiss when it was made at the hearing 
because Fearon failed to establish a prima facie case. 
8
 37 PERB U3002 (2004). 
J 9 CSEA v. PERB and Diaz, 132 AD2d 430, 20 PERB 1J7024 (3d Dep't 1987), aff'd on 
other grounds, 73 NY2d 796, 21 PERB 1J7017 (1988). 
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Fearon's basic argument is that she disagrees with the manner in which UFT 
handled this grievance. As we have noted in previous cases, including a case involving 
these same parties,10 a union is given wide latitude in determining whether and to what 
extent it will pursue a grievance. There is no evidence here that UFT's conduct in 
handling the grievance brought by Fearon was arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. 
Based-on-the foregoing, we deny_the„balance_oiFearonls exceptions-and-affirm--
the dismissal of the charge for the reasons stated here. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: September 30, 2004 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
10
 United Fed'n of Teachers (Fearon), 33 PERB1J3003 (2000). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEWBURGH TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, AFT, 
AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. CP-866 
NEWBURGH ENLARGED CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
JAMES R. SANDNER, ESQ. (ROBERT T. REILLY of counsel), for Petitioner 
SHAW & PERELSON, LLP (JAY M. SIEGEL of counsel), for Employer 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ of 
counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) and cross-exceptions filed by 
the Newburgh Teachers' Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO (Association) to a 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) placing teaching assistants in the unit 
represented by the Association. 
The Association filed this unit clarification/unit placement petition asserting that 
the newly created position of teaching assistant is or should be in its unit of all 
Board - CP-866 -2 
professional certified personnel employed by the Newburgh Enlarged City School 
District (District). CSEA intervened in the proceeding claiming that the teaching 
assistants were already in its unit of all non-instructional personnel and that the title 
shared a community of interest with the other titles in its unit, including teacher aides. 
The ALJ found that the newly created title of teaching assistant was not in the 
-Association!^bargaining,unit,_notwithstandingjthe„broadJanguage_Qfthe recognition 
clause in the most recent Association-District collective bargaining agreement, which 
defines the unit as "all professional certified personnel." The unit clarification aspect of 
the Association's petition was, therefore, dismissed. The Association's unit placement 
petition was, however, granted. The ALJ, in reliance on a long line of decisions by this 
Board, the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director), and 
ALJs, found the teaching assistants to be allied professional employees most 
appropriately grouped with teachers and other instructional personnel and placed the 
teaching assistants in the Association's bargaining unit. 
EXCEPTIONS 
CSEA excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that teacher aides and teaching 
assistants both perform instructional duties within the District and that teaching 
assistants are not professional employees and, therefore, cannot be appropriately 
placed in the Association's unit. The Association cross-excepts to the ALJ's decision, 
arguing that it was error to dismiss the unit clarification aspect of its petition. In all other 
respects, the Association supports the ALJ's decision. The District has not filed a 
response. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
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FACTS 
The parties stipulated to all the relevant facts, which clearly are set forth in the 
ALJ's decision.1 The facts are repeated here only as necessary to address the 
exceptions and cross-exceptions. 
The Association represents all professional certified personnel in the District in a 
---unitotapproximatelyJ ,050„em^ 
instructional personnel employed by the District. The District never employed teaching 
assistants before November 2002, when it began abolishing teacher aide positions and 
simultaneously hiring teaching assistants to fill those positions.3 
On November 26, 2002, the District recognized CSEA as the exclusive 
representative of teaching assistants. The Association thereafter filed the instant 
petition. The District, at the time the petition was filed, employed approximately 125 
teaching assistants and 75 teacher aides. 
The impetus for the District's decision to employ teaching assistants was the 
federal No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) of 2001.4 In relevant part, the NCLB requires 
1
 37 PERB H4007 (2004). 
2
 Article 1, Recognition, provides, in relevant part: 
that the District having determined that the [Association] is 
supported by a majority of teachers and sign language 
interpreters in a unit comprised of all professional certified 
personnel...hereby recognizes the [Association] as the 
exclusive negotiating agent for the teachers, sign language 
interpreters, Assistant Summer School Principal and 
Assistant Evening High School Principal in such unit. 
3
 Most, if not all, teaching assistants were previously employed by the District as teacher 
aides. 
J 4
 20 USC §6301 (2002). 
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-\ that school districts ensure that all teachers hired after the enactment of the NCLB shall 
be highly qualified and that all "paraprofessionals" shall have a high school diploma, 
meet a rigorous standard of quality, demonstrating certain skills based upon State 
assessment, or have completed two years of study at an institution of higher education 
or possess an associate's degree or higher.5 
Xhe teacher aides^employed-byJhe^District arenot required_to_haveany_ 
certification, license or educational attainment beyond a high school diploma. Teacher 
aides are in the non-competitive class of the Civil Service and participate in the New 
York State and Local Retirement System. Pursuant to the Education Law and the Rules 
and Regulations of the Commissioner of Education, teacher aides do not require 
certification and do not instruct students. They function as support personnel under the 
direct supervision of teachers.6 Teacher aides do not receive tenure under the 
Education Law, although they do obtain some job security pursuant to provisions of the 
CSEA-District collective bargaining agreement. 
Teaching assistants must obtain, and then maintain, proper certification as 
required by the State Education Department.7 Initially, teaching assistants may receive 
a one-year temporary license by possessing a high school diploma and such other 
training and experience as are appropriate to the position in question. A continuing 
certificate may thereafter be issued, upon application by the superintendent of schools, 
to a teaching assistant who possesses a high school diploma, six semester hours of 
appropriate collegiate study and one year of experience as a teaching assistant or a 
5
 20 USC §6319 (2002). 
6
 Education Law, §3009. See also 8 NYCRR 80-5.6. 
7
 8 NYCRR, 80-5. 
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teacher. Such a certificate is valid continuously as long as the holder has been 
employed as a teaching assistant for five consecutive years. More advanced 
certification may be obtained by the completion of additional years of acceptable 
collegiate study and satisfactory performance on the New York State Teacher 
Certification Examination Test of Communicative and Quantitative skills. Teaching 
assistants,„underJhe generalsupemsion.of^ 
services to students.8 
Teaching assistants participate in the New York State Teachers' Retirement 
System. After the successful completion of a probationary period, teaching assistants 
obtain tenure and are subject to Education Law §3020-a. 
The parties stipulated that prior to the employment of teaching assistants, 
teachers in the District, on occasion, utilized teacher aides to provide direct instructional 
services to students, with the knowledge of the District. Most of those direct instructional 
services are now provided by the teaching assistants, many of whom were formerly 
teacher aides. The performance of direct instruction by teacher aides is not consistent 
with the provisions of the Education Law or the Rules and Regulations of the 
Commissioner of Education. 
DISCUSSION 
We dismiss at the outset CSEA's argument that fragmentation standards should 
be applied to this case. CSEA argues that the teaching assistants are included in its 
unit by virtue of the District's recognition of CSEA as the bargaining agent for teaching 
assistants shortly after the creation of the title in the District and that the petition for unit 
clarification/unit placement must be dismissed because that is not the appropriate 
8
 Supra, note 7. 
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vehicle for a fragmentation case. The District's initial recognition of CSEA as the 
representative for the newly created title of teaching assistant unit does not establish a 
long-standing unit that should not be disturbed; nor does it bar the filing of a 
representation petition less than 30 days after the recognition.9 
The Association cross-excepts to the ALJ's dismissal of the unit clarification 
portion-ofJts_p.eti.tion, arguing thatthe teaching^assistantsarecertified .professional 
personnel and are, by virtue of the contractual recognition clause, in its bargaining unit. 
The ALJ found that the language of the recognition clause was only the beginning of the 
inquiry and, because there was no other relevant contractual language and no evidence 
that the District and the Association had intended the recognition clause to include any 
and all professional, certified titles thereafter created by the District, the teaching 
assistants were not already encompassed in the Association's unit. 
As the Association relies solely on the contractual language to support its unit 
clarification petition, it must be plain from that language that the position is 
encompassed within the unit. It is the parties' intent at the time that they agreed to the 
language in question that controls.10 The language of the recognition clause specifically 
refers to the fact that the District has ascertained that the Association is supported by a 
majority of teacher and sign language interpreters in a unit composed of all professional 
certified personnel and then lists the titles that the Association was recognized to 
represent. As the recognition clause lists the titles which are included in the unit, despite 
See Malone Cent. Sen. Dist, 31 PERB 1J3050 (1998). 
' Monroe-Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist, 33 PERB 1J3007 (2000). 
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its broadly-worded initial definition of the unit, it cannot be read as including the teaching 
assistants.11 
So, too, must we reject CSEA's argument that the unit clarification portion of the 
petition should have been granted as to CSEA. CSEA's unit consists of non-
instructional personnel employed by the District. By the very nature of their job duties 
andthe statutoryxlefinition ofItheir. title, _teaching_assistants_areinstructional .pBrsonnel__ 
and, therefore, are not already encompassed in CSEA's non-instructional unit. 
The crux of CSEA's argument as to the unit placement portion of the petition is 
that teaching assistants are not professional employees and, therefore, consistent with 
our decision in Ichabod Crane Central School District?2 cannot be placed in the unit of 
professional employees represented by the Association. This argument misapprehends 
the rationale utilized in Ichabod Crane and ignores a long line of decisions of the Board, 
the Director and ALJs that have consistently included teaching assistants in units of 
teachers.13 
Ichabod Crane involved a fragmentation petition seeking to remove registered 
nurses from a unit of non-instructional employees. We there decided that the standard 
of inadequate representation or conflict of interest normally used in deciding 
"Id. 
12
 33 PERB fl3042 (2000), confirmed sub. nom. CSEA vPERB, 300 AD2d 927, 35 
PERB 1J7020 (3d Dep't 2002). 
13
 Eastchester Union Free Sch. Dist, 28 PERB 1J3064, at 3147 (1995). See also 
Manchester-Shortsville Cent. Sch. Dist, 30 PERB 1J3050 (1997) (subsequent history 
omitted); Dutchess County BOCES, 25 PERB P048, aff'g 25 PERB 1J4001 (1992); 
Onondaga-Cortland-Madison BOCES, 23 PERB 1J3014 (1990). See also Cheektowaga 
Cent. Sch. Dist, 34 PERB 1J4006 (2001); South Huntington Union Free Sch. Dist, 33 
PERB H4041 (2000); Pine Valley Cent. Sch. Dist, 31 PERB 1J4013 (1998); Brocton 
Cent Sch. Dist, 30 PERB 1J4020 (1997); South Manor Union Free Sch. Dist, 30 PERB 
1J4001 (1997); Rockville Centre Union Free Sch. Dist, 29 PERB 1J4016 (1996); Clinton-
Essex-Warren-Washington BOCES, 24 PERB 1J4030 (1991). 
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^ fragmentation cases should not be used in cases involving registered nurses because it 
was inconsistent with the standards we used in initial uniting cases. Under that 
standard, we never include registered nurses in units of non-professional, non-
instructional employees. We determined that the duties of nurses established an 
arguable unique community of interest and/or conflict of interest with other, 
__-no.nprofessional.,_ejripioyj^ ^ 
contact with students, teachers, administrators, and parents. Our decision was not 
based on only the professional status of registered nurses, although that was a factor. 
We also considered the qualifications, education, and duties of registered nurses as 
compared to other employees. 
So, too, here, the ALJ's decision was not limited to the professional status of 
teaching assistants, but specifically referenced the importance of the certification 
requirements imposed upon teaching assistants and their direct instructional duties. 
Teaching assistants and teachers share a compelling, unique community of interest, 
distinguishable from the District's non-instructional personnel that warrants the 
placement of teaching assistants in units of other instructional personnel. Our decision 
in Ichabod Crane neither compels nor even suggests deviation from our well-
established standard in initial uniting cases involving teaching assistants. 
That some teachers in the District have in the past utilized some teacher aides to 
provide direct instructional services does not require a contrary conclusion. We will not 
base this representation decision on the occasional and erroneous assignment of 
instructional duties to uncertified personnel, in contravention of both Education Law and 
the Commissioner's Rules and Regulations, as well as the NCLB. 
Board - CP-866 -9 
Based on the foregoing, we deny CSEA's exceptions and the Association's 
cross-exceptions, and affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
The parties' stipulation of facts indicates that the Association's unit is composed 
of approximately 1,050 employees and that the number of teaching assistants employed 
by the District is 125. As the number of positions sought to be added to the unit does 
._ _ notraise_anJssue„asJoJhej3ontjnm 
placement petition is the appropriate vehicle for seeking to accrete the title of teaching 
assistant. 
Accordingly, the unit placement petition is granted and the teaching assistant title 
is hereby added to the unit represented by the Association. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: September 30, 2004 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
'John T. Mitchell, Mefrfber 
) 14
 Ogdensburg City Sen. Dist, 31 PERB 1J4011, rev'd on other grounds, 31 PERB 
113060(1998). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. CP-905 
SOUTHERN CAYUGA CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
- and -
SOUTHERN CAYUGA CENTRAL SCHOOL TEACHERS 
ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ 
of counsel), for Petitioner 
MATTHEW R. FLETCHER, for Employer 
JAMES D. MATHEWS, for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) which dismissed its petition for unit placement seeking 
the inclusion of teaching assistants employed by the Southern Cayuga Central School 
District (District) in its unit of non-instructional employees and placed the teaching 
assistants in a unit of teachers represented by the Southern Cayuga Central School 
Board - CP-905 -2 
Teachers Association, AFL-CIO (Association), who intervened in the proceeding. The 
District has filed exceptions and cross-exceptions to the ALJ's decision. 
The ALJ found that the teaching assistants, as certificated professionals, could 
not, as a matter of law, be placed in a unit of non-professional employees. He also 
found that the teaching assistants shared a greater community of interest with the 
teachers represented-by-the_Associationthan_with-the_non=instmctionaLemplQyees.,-
including teacher aides, in the unit represented by CSEA. 
EXCEPTIONS 
CSEA excepts, arguing that the ALJ erred on the facts and the law. The District 
also excepts to the ALJ's decision asserting that the teaching assistants are not 
professional employees and should not be included in the unit with teachers. Both argue 
that the Board should reverse its prior decisions which held that teaching assistants are 
most appropriately placed in units of teachers and not in units with non-instructional 
employees. The Association supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm, for the reasons stated herein, the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts, which is set forth in the ALJ's 
decision.1 The facts are repeated here only as necessary to address the exceptions and 
cross-exceptions. Additional facts gleaned from the record are included in this decision 
as necessary. 
) 137 PERB U4008 (2004). 
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-\ The Association represents the District's employees who require professional 
certification by the New York State Education Department. CSEA represents the 
District's non-instructional employees, in both white-collar and blue-collar titles, 
including the school nurses. 
There are three teaching assistants employed by the District. The teaching 
assistant titlahas always.been.unrepresented.^Likeieachers, theieaching_assistants 
are in the unclassified Civil Service and are certified pursuant to the Education Law and 
the Rules and Regulations of the Commissioner of Education promulgated thereunder.2 
Teaching assistants are "appointed by a board of education to provide, under the 
general supervision of a licensed or certified teacher, direct instructional services to 
students."3 Teachers and teaching assistants are members of the New York State 
Teachers' Retirement System and may obtain tenure. Both teachers and teaching 
assistants have dental insurance and the same health insurance benefits. Teachers and 
teaching assistants work the same calendar year and teaching assistants, like teachers, 
are paid on days school is closed due to inclement weather. Teaching assistants work 
bus duty and may teach in summer school. Teaching assistants also have a daily 
preparation period. 
No titles in the CSEA unit, including teacher aides, are certificated employees, 
although the registered nurses are licensed. The Chemung County Civil Service 
Commission's job description for teacher aides states that they assist teachers by 
"relieving them of that part of their duties that can be performed by non-certificated 
2
 8 NYCRR 80-5. 
J 38NYCRR80-5.6(b)(1). 
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personnel." Teacher aides may be assigned by a board of education to assist teachers 
in non-teaching duties.4 Teacher aides participate in the New York State Employees' 
Retirement System. They are not eligible for tenure, they are subject to more restrictive 
payment for snow days, do not work the same calendar as the teaching assistants or 
the same number of hours per day, and do not receive dental insurance. 
__ Bothieacheraidesand teaching assist^^ 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), submit weekly time sheets and receive the same 
longevity payments. The parties stipulated that both teacher aides and teaching 
assistants perform many of the same non-instructional duties, including study hall duty. 
Like teachers, teaching assistants have been assigned to bus duty and a teaching 
assistant has been employed as a summer school teacher. The parties further 
stipulated that the teaching assistants and some teacher aides are employed to work 
directly with students in an instructional setting. 
The District filed an offer of proof with the ALJ after the stipulation of facts was 
submitted, offering further argument as to the similarity in duties performed by both the 
teaching assistants and teacher aides in both instructional and non-instructional 
settings. The District also offered evidence of a conflict of interest between teaching 
assistants and teachers because they compete for the same work, asserting that when 
it has been necessary to abolish positions in the past, the Association has 
recommended that teaching assistant and teacher aide positions be cut in order to 
preserve teaching positions. The ALJ did not accept the offer of proof as part of the 
) 4
 8 NYCRR 80-5.6(a). 
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\ record upon which his decision was based, nor did he schedule a hearing to take 
evidence as to the offer of proof. 
DISCUSSION 
The District argues initially that the ALJ erred by denying the offer of proof and 
deciding the case on the stipulated record. The facts offered by the District were not 
relevant Jot the Jssuesinvolved in this_case!..an.d. the ALJ correctly _deoidad.Jhat„a„_haaring 
to take the evidence offered by the District was unnecessary. 
This agency has consistently held,5 in initial uniting or placement decisions, such 
as this, that teaching assistants should be included in units of teachers.6 Indeed, in 
Newburgh Enlarged City School District,7 decided by us today, we reiterated that: 
Teaching assistants and teachers share a compelling, 
unique community of interest, distinguishable from the 
District's non-instructional personnel, that warrants the 
1
 placement of teaching assistants in units of other 
instructional personnel. 
5
 Because of the number of decisions on this same issue decided by this agency, we 
decline to comment on or follow the private sector decisions or other public sector 
agencies' decisions cited by CSEA in its brief regarding the unit placement of teaching 
assistants. See, e.g., Ad Hoc Committee of Regents College Degrees and 
Examinations Professional Employees, 24 PERB1J6501 (January 29, 1991). 
6
 Eastchester Union Free Sch. Dist, 28 PERB 1J3064, at 3147 (1995). See also 
Manchester-Shortsville Cent. Sch. Dist, 30 PERB 1J3050 (1997) (subsequent history 
omitted); Dutchess County BOCES, 25 PERB H3048, aff'g 25 PERB 1J4001 (1992); 
Onondaga-Cortland-Madison BOCES, 23 PERB P014 (1990); Cheektowaga Cent. 
Sch. Dist, 34 PERB 1J4006 (2001); South Huntington Union Free Sch. Dist, 33 PERB 
H4041 (2000); Pine Valley Cent. Sch. Dist, 31 PERB 1J4013 (1998); Brocton Cent. Sch. 
Dist, 30 PERB 1J4020 (1997); South Manor Union Free Sch. Dist, 30 PERB 1J4001 
(1997); Rockville Centre Union Free Sch. Dist, 29 PERB 1J4016 (1996); Clinton-Essex-
Warren-Washington BOCES, 24 PERB 1J4030 (1991). 
) 7 37 PERB P027 (2004). 
Board - CP-905 -6 
As was the case in Newburgh, the District and CSEA here, as well as the ALJ in 
this case, have misinterpreted and misapplied our decision in Ichabod Crane Central 
School District (hereafter, Ichabod Crane).8 We have decided today that: 
Ichabod Crane involved a fragmentation petition seeking to 
remove registered nurses from a unit of non-instructional 
employees. We there decided that the standard of 
inadequate representation or conflict of interest normally 
_usad_in_deddingJra.g.m.entatiQn_c.as.e.s_s.hauId_no.t_bje_u.s.adJn_.. 
cases involving registered nurses because it was 
inconsistent with the standards we used in initial uniting 
cases. Under that standard, we never included registered 
nurses in units of non-professional, non-instructional 
employees. We determined that the duties of nurses 
established an arguable unique community of interest and/or 
conflict of interest with other, nonprofessional, employees 
who may not have any similar duties requiring daily, direct 
contact with students, teachers, administrators, and parents. 
Our decision was not based on only the professional status 
of registered nurses, although that was a factor. We also 
considered the qualifications, education, and duties of 
registered nurses as compared to other employees.9 
We stated in Ichabod Crane that we were not deviating from our uniting 
standards but were returning to the early standards we had applied in initial uniting 
cases involving nurses and bringing fragmentation decisions back to that standard. 
Nothing in that decision compels a finding that, as a matter of law, professionals may 
never be included in a unit with non-professionals. Our emphasis was that professional 
status was one element, albeit a very important element, in determining whether titles 
shared a community of interest. Community of interest is still the cornerstone of our 
uniting decisions. 
8
 33 PERB 1J3042 (2000), confirmed sub nom CSEA v. PERB, 300 AD2d 927, 35 PERB 
1J7020 (3d Dep't 2002). 
) 
9
 Supra, note 7. 
Board - CP-905 -7 
-N There is no evidence in this record which would require a deviation from our 
long-established standard of placing teaching assistants in units of teachers. The 
District's arguments to the contrary, the use of teacher aides, in certain circumstances, 
to provide instructional services does not establish a community of interest between 
teacher aides and teaching assistants. Teacher aides, by Federal and State law and the 
regulations promulgatedJhereunder, are_not authorizedJo„pTovidejnstructiQnaLservices„ 
to students. The Chemung County Civil Service Commission job description for teacher 
aides does not authorize such an assignment. The erroneous assignment by the District 
of such responsibilities to teacher aides cannot be considered in deciding the most 
appropriate unit placement for teaching assistants who are, by law and regulation, 
specifically authorized to provide direct instructional services. The shared professional 
mission, daily interaction with students in an instructional setting, certification and 
educational requirements, retirement system and tenure, as well as work year, all 
support the inclusion of teaching assistants in the Association's unit of teachers. 
The District also argues the ALJ failed to consider the administrative 
convenience of the District in reaching his uniting decision. The District asserts that the 
disparity in salary and benefits between teaching assistants and teachers, as well as the 
District's different methodology in compensation and differences in record-keeping for 
the two titles, would make the inclusion of teaching assistants in the Association's unit 
administratively inconvenient. We have previously rejected the notion that a disparity in 
benefits and salary would compel a finding that teaching assistants are not 
appropriately placed in a unit of teachers, as we have rejected the argument that 
) 
Board - CP-905 -8 
because teachers may exercise some supervisory role with respect to teaching 
assistants, their joinder in the same bargaining unit is inappropriate.10 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the exceptions filed by CSEA and the 
exceptions and cross-exceptions filed by the District, and affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
The record indicates that the Association's unit is composed of approximately 
JJ10_employ£.es^andJhatihere are o^ 
District. As the number of positions sought to be added to the unit does not raise an 
issue as to the continuing majority status of the Association,11 the placement petition is 
the appropriate vehicle for seeking to accrete the title of teaching assistant. 
Accordingly, the unit placement petition is granted and the teaching assistant 
position hereby is added to the unit represented by the Association. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: September 30, 2004 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
10 
11 
Eastchester Union Free Sen. Dist, 28 PERB1J3064 (1995). 
Ogdensburg City Sch. Dist, 31 PERB 1J4011, rev'd on other grounds, 31 PERB 
113060(1998). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GREENBURGH UNIFORMED FIREFIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION, INC., LOCAL 1586, IAFF, AFL-CIO 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-24197 
HARTSDALE FIRE DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
MEYER, SUOZZI, ENGLISH & KLEIN, P.C. (HANAN R. KOLKO of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
SHAW & PERELSON, LLP (JAY M. SIEGEL of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Hartsdale Fire District (District) 
to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that found the District violated 
§§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when, on 
December 11, 2002, it issued a counseling memorandum to James Damon in retaliation 
for his exercise of protected rights. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The District excepts to the ALJ's decision on the facts and the law. The 
Greenburgh Uniformed Firefighters Association, Inc., Local 1586, IAFF, AFL-CIO 
(Association) filed cross-exceptions to the ALJ's dismissal of the §209-a.1(d) violation 
alleged in the charge. The Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) declined to process on alleged violation of CSL §209-a.1 (b) based upon 
insufficient facts to support the charge. The Association has not excepted to that ruling. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
T-h.e-parti.e.S-.s.tip.u.late.d_to-fa.cts_ente.i:e.dJn.to_the_re.co.nd asJointExhibit .#_!._ The 
stipulated facts reveal that the District "issued a warning memorandum dated December 
11, 2002 to GUFA [Association] unit member, James Damon, for conducting a 'plectron' 
and/or radio test three minutes late because he was allegedly engaged in union 
business on November 25, 2002 without the HFD [District] Chief's approval."1 
The Association's improper practice charge alleges that: "[c]ontrary to the 
statements contained in Schoonmaker's memorandum of December 11, 2002, Damon 
was not discussing union business at the time of the scheduled radio test." 
The stipulation also notes that, between November 1, 2001 and December 31, 
2002, a number of instances occurred where Association members were late 
performing the plectron test and the District did not issue a corresponding warning 
memorandum. 
In addition to the stipulated facts, the record reflects that Damon, a firefighter with 
the District for 17 years, has held various offices within the Association. At the time of 
the improper practice charge, he was a trustee and member of the Association's 
1
 A plectron test is a radio test. Volunteers have home based radio units and, at 7:15 
p.m. on the evenings when the test is conducted, a button is pressed that sets off tones 
to test whether the radios used by the volunteers are working (Transcript, pp. 41-2). 
Executive Board. In his capacity as trustee, Damon serves as the Association's 
representative with respect to the District's bargaining units when the Association's vice 
president, Chip Nanko, is unavailable. 
On November 25, 2002, Damon was assigned to the watch desk for both the day 
and night shift. His shift ran from at 8:00 a.m. on November 25 to 8:00 a.m. on 
November26, 2002.J/Vhile_on desk watch,„Qne_olhis.primary_respansJbilities„wasJQ 
record who was present on a particular shift. Damon testified on cross-examination that 
he did not make such a record. He testified that, at about 7:00 p.m. on November 25, 
2002, he was seated at the front desk and, in that area, Chip Nanko and Frank 
Lacalamita were also present. Nanko and Lacalamita began discussing a conference 
that was to take place at PERB on November 26, 2002. The Association had previously 
filed an improper practice charge (U-23734) against the District alleging a violation of 
§§209-a.1 (a) and (d) of the Act.2 
During this conversation between Nanko and Lacalamita, Damon testified that he 
kept his back to them and that he continued reading a book. Suddenly, Lacalamita 
turned to Damon and warned him about the time. The test was to have been done at 
7:15 p.m. and Damon performed the test at 7:18 p.m. At the same time, Damon 
commenced the test, Deputy Chief Peter Hirsch walked into the room. 
2
 The Board takes notice that the Association filed improper practice charge U-23734 
against the District alleging that the District executed a collective bargaining agreement 
with individual fire officers of the Association's bargaining unit. The bargaining unit 
consists of all paid full-time firefighters and fire officers up to and including the rank of 
Deputy Chief. The charge was settled and withdrawn by the Association on March 26, 
2003. 
-\ Hirsch testified that, at about 6:30 p.m., he noticed Lacalamita with Nanko and 
Damon. Hirsch observed a large amount of documents in the watch desk area that are 
not normally there. These documents were prior collective bargaining agreements and 
they were spread out between Nanko, Lacalamita and Damon. He went back to the 
kitchen area to continue preparing dinner. When dinner was complete, Hirsch made a 
chowcall but no one_cameintoihe_kitchen.. Hirsch walkedjdown the_hall_to_repeat_the„__. 
chow call when he observed Nanko reading the documents. Hirsch continued down the 
hall and overheard Lacalamita yell to Damon, "Jim, plectron". Hirsch witnessed Damon 
actuate the plectron tones. Hirsch walked into the watch desk area and looked at the 
official department clock as well as others in the room. The official clock showed the 
time as "19:18" or 7:18 p.m. Hirsch said to Damon, "I cannot believe that you guys 
missed the plectron test because you are in here doing union business." There was no 
response. Nanko acknowledged on cross-examination that Hirsch made this remark 
"[i]n similar to those words". Hirsch's unrebutted testimony noted that this was the third 
time Damon has performed the plectron test late. 
Nanko testified that, after Hirsch left the watch desk room where he, Damon, and 
Lacalamita were seated, he said to Damon, "Do you want to make note in the book that 
Deputy Chief Hirsch accused us of missing the plectron test and Jim [Damon] pretty 
much said 'no'." Nanko testified that Damon replied, "I put the right time in [the log] and 
nothing is going to come of it. No one's ever gotten in trouble before. It's no big deal, 
and that was it, and I went to go eat dinner and then Jim came out to eat dinner." But, 
conversely, Damon testified that "Chip took it upon his own and said to me 'Maybe you 
should put this in that you were doing union business just to circumvent because he 
thinks this.' That's when I [Damon] said, That s ridiculous. I have done nothing 
wrong.'" 
Later in the evening of November 25, 2002, an entry was placed into the log 
book that the plectron test was performed late because of union business. There is a 
dispute in the testimony as to how the entry was originated. Hirsch testified that Nanko 
cameJnto-Jnis_a1fice_and_statedJhatJ!w£^ 
log that the plectron was given late because we were doing union business." Damon 
testified that Hirsch directed him to make the entry and gave Nanko the exact wording 
to use. Nanko's testimony corroborated Damon's account of what took place. The 
testimony is uncontroverted that Hirsch directed Damon to place a similar entry into the 
daily report. The daily report is a typewritten report that is generated twice a day and 
submitted to Chief Schoonmaker on a daily basis. Hirsch testified that he informed 
Schoonmaker on November 26, 2002 of the incident. 
Schoonmaker testified that he issued the warning memorandum to Damon on 
December 11, 2002 after discussion with Hirsch and reading the daily reports. 
Schoonmaker concluded that Damon had violated the contract. Schoonmaker testified 
on cross-examination that, under the same circumstances, had Damon not been a 
union official, he would not have issued a warning memorandum. His stated reason for 
issuing the memorandum to Damon was Article XI, section 1, of the parties' collective 
bargaining agreement. Article XI, section 1, states that: 
The Officers of the Firefighters Association will be permitted to perform 
such functions as may be required in the normal execution of their 
duties during their normal work shift providing: 
a. Such activities do not interfere with normally scheduled duties. 
b. They have the approval of the Chief of the Department. 
Schoonmaker also pointed out that he has warned Damon in the past 
about performing the test late. 
Damon testified that in the past he has asked the Chief for permission to 
do union related activities during work hours. He cited as examples a request 
to use the truck to raise money for Muscular Dystrophy and meetings with 
members to discuss ratification of a proposed contract. 
DISCUSSION 
The ALJ concluded that the issue to be decided was whether the 
District's action was motivated by legitimate business reasons or whether its 
asserted defense is pretextual. 
We held in Town of Independence3 that in order to establish a violation 
of subdivisions (a) and (c) of §209-a.1 that the charging party must prove that: 
1. The affected individual was engaged in protected activity 
2. Such activity was known to the person(s) making the adverse 
employment decision 
3. The action would not have been taken "but for" the protected 
activity 
4. The existence of anti-union animus may be established by 
statements or by circumstantial evidence, which may be rebutted 
by presentation of legitimate business reasons for the action 
taken. 
23 PERB H3020(1990). 
The ALJ concluded that "Damon performed the [plectron] test at 7:18 p.m., three 
minutes late." Schoonmaker issued the warning memorandum to Damon on December 
11, 2002. The stipulated facts entered into the record notes that, "[d]uring the period 
November 1, 2001 through December 31, 2002, there have been a number of instances 
where CUFA [Association] members were late in conducting plectron and/or radio tests 
!Land_the_DJsMct_did._nolissu^^ 
issuing the warning memorandum was Damon's position as an officer in the Association 
and the contract language contained in Article XI of the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement. 
The ALJ thus concluded that, unless the warning memorandum of December 11, 
2002 was motivated by legitimate reasons, the District engaged in discriminatory 
treatment of Damon because of his union activity in contrast to all others who performed 
the plectron test but were not officers of the Association. The ALJ found the District's 
reliance on Article XI of the collective bargaining agreement was pretextual. The ALJ 
reasoned that Article XI does not prohibit anything. In fact, it permits union activities 
during working hours with prior approval. The ALJ dismissed the District's argument 
that a past practice would develop unless Article XI was enforced. The ALJ pointed out 
our prior decisions4 that permit an employer to revert to the terms of the parties' 
collective bargaining agreement on a subject that has been negotiated. Lastly, the ALJ 
concluded that the timing of the warning memorandum was further support that the 
District's reliance on Article XI of the collective bargaining agreement was pretextual. In 
4
 Florida Union Free Sch. Dist, 31 PERB 1J3056 (1998); State of New York-Unified 
Court System, 26 PERB 1J3013 (1993). 
-x support of this conclusion, the ALJ noted that the parties were scheduled at PERB for a 
conference on November 26, 2002 in Case No. U-23734. Damon and Nanko were to 
attend the conference. The union activity Schoonmaker attributed to Damon concerned 
his discussion with Nanko and Lacalamita regarding the November 26, 2002 conference 
at PERB that Hirsch witnessed. The ALJ noted that Hirsch was one of the fire officers 
who_exeeutedihej;oJlectiv^ 
even though Damon and Nanko dispute Hirsch's account of their conversation on 
November 25, 2002, the ALJ credited Hirsch's testimony. 
The District contends the ALJ erred in concluding that its reliance on Article XI of 
the collective bargaining agreement was pretextual. It is undisputed that Schoonmaker 
knew of Damon's position in the Association and, through Hirsch, became aware of the 
discussion between Damon, Nanko and Lacalamita concerning the conference at PERB 
) 
in Case No. U-23734. The District misunderstands the nature of an improper practice 
charge that alleges a violation of §209-a.1 (a) and (c) in the face of competing contract 
language. In City of Albany,5 the court determined that the City could not, under the 
guise of exercising a ministerial or management prerogative, deprive its employees of 
their statutory rights to participate in an employee organization. The District confuses 
its management right to enforce the collective bargaining agreement with the 
employee's protected rights under the Taylor Law. But for Damon's position as an 
officer in the Association, Schoonmaker testified that he would not have issued the 
warning memorandum. His ostensible reason was to enforce the language of Article XI. 
However, by singling Damon out simply because of his position as an officer of the 
) 5 29 NY2d 433, 5 PERB 1J7000 (1972). 
\ Association, Schoonmaker's conduct had a chilling effect on participation in the 
Association under the Taylor Law. Here, the District was not without its remedy for 
Damon's neglect to perform the plectron test. Schoonmaker acknowledged on cross-
examination that he could have protected the District's rights under Article XI through 
arbitration. Article X of the parties' collective bargaining agreement permits either party 
to-Submita_dis.p.ute_ove.r:.th.e: ..application _oIthe_ terms. _of_ Article X l jp jhe Amexican 
Arbitration Association. We, therefore, conclude that the District violated §§209-a.1 (a) 
and (c) of the Act. 
The Association cross-excepts to the ALJ's decision to dismiss the §209-a.1(d) 
charge on the theory that the record established a past practice of performing the 
plectron test late without any repercussions from Schoonmaker. We reject this 
argument. 
The ALJ noted that the District may have permitted its employees to engage in 
union activities. The ALJ concluded that the record did not support the Association's 
alleged §209-a.1(d) violation and concluded that "the District may unilaterally revert to 
the term of Article XI." We held in State of New York - Unified Court System6 that an 
employer is privileged 
to revert to the terms of its collective bargaining agreement 
notwithstanding an inconsistent past practice. Our theory was that 
having reached an agreement on a subject matter, that agreement, 
not any practice with respect thereto, fixed and controlled the terms 
and conditions of employment. In effect, despite the reversion from 
practice to the contract terms, the status quo was nonetheless 
maintained. 
; 
6
 26 PERB 1J3013, at 3025 (1993). 
We have found that the terms of waiver by agreement and contract reversion 
have been used interchangeably to characterize a duty satisfaction defense.7 But, in 
this case, the District's treated Damon differently because of his position in the 
Association. As noted earlier, Schoonmaker clearly would not have issued the 
December 11, 2002 warning memorandum to Damon but for his position as an 
Association^officer. Thus.the District would haye^ b^ ^^  
of Article XI had it not engaged in the impermissible conduct of singling out Damon for 
discipline. The District may not treat Association officials any differently from any other 
unit member. We concur with the ALJ that, upon this record, the Association has not 
established the elements of a past practice that Association officials may rely upon and 
disregard the plain and clear language of Article XI. 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny the District's exceptions and deny the 
Association's cross-exceptions and affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDER that the District, forthwith: 
1. Rescind the December 11, 2002 counseling memo that it issued to James 
Damon for being three minutes late in performing a plectron test on 
November 25, 2002; 
2. Cease and desist from interfering with, restraining, coercing or 
discriminating against employees for the exercise of rights protected under 
the Act by treating unauthorized union activities by officers of the 
Association differently than it treats the unauthorized activities of other unit 
7
 County of Nassau, 31 PERB 1J3074 (1998). 
members; 
3. Sign and post the attach notice at all locations customarily used to post 
notices to employees represented by the Association. 
DATED: September 30, 2004 
Albany, New York
 i 
MichaeLR._Cuevas,„Chairman 
/ 1 John T. Mitchell, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBETC^MPEOYMENTTlELATrONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Hartsdale Fire District in the unit represented by the 
Greenburgh Uniformed Firefighters Association, Inc., Local 1586, IAFF, AFL-CIO, that 
the Hartsdale Fire District forthwith: 
1. Will rescind the December 11,2002 counseling memo that it issued to James Damon for 
being three minutes late in performing a plectron test on November 25, 2002; 
2. Will not interfere with, restrain, coerce or discriminate against employees for the exercise 
of rights protected under the Act by treating unauthorized union activities by officers of 
the Association differently than it treats the unauthorized activities of other unit 
members. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
Hartsdale Fire District 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be 
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF EMTs & 
PARAMEDICS, SEIU/NAGE, AFL-CIO, 
— _ _.. Petitioner, 
- a n d - CASE NO. C-5372 
COUNTY OF ALBANY AND SHERIFF , 
Employer. 
STEVEN H. WEIGAND, for Petitioner 
MICHAEL C. LYNCH, COUNTY ATTORNEY (AMY E. JOYCE of Counsel), for 
Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On January 14, 2004, the International Association of EMTs & Paramedics, 
SEIU/NAGE, AFL-CIO (petitioner), filed, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of 
the Public Employment Relations Board, a timely petition seeking certification as the 
exclusive representative of certain employees of the County of Albany and Sheriff 
(employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they stipulated 
that the following negotiating unit was appropriate: 
Included: All full-time and regular part-time emergency medical technicians 
and paramedics. 
Excluded: Paramedics supervisors and all other employees. 
y Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on May 5, 2004, at 
which a majority of ballots were cast against representation by the petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
voters in the unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
collective bargaining by the petitioner, 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the petition should be, and it hereby is, 
-dismissed ..- — ... 
DATED: September 30, 2004 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
X 
hn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF EASTCHESTER POLICE OFFICERS 
UNION, INC. (LIEUTENANTS AND CAPTAINS UNIT), 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5427 
TOWN OF EASTCHESTER, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Town of Eastchester Police Officers Union, 
Inc. (Lieutenants and Captains Unit) has been designated and selected by a majority of 
the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
^ 
Certification - C-5427 - 2 -
Included: All lieutenants and captains. 
Excluded: Chief of Police and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Town of Eastchester Police Officers Union, Inc. 
(Lieutenants and Captains Unit). The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual 
obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. Such 
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of 
a concession. 
DATED: Sptember 30, 2004 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF EASTCHESTER POLICE OFFICERS 
UNION, INC., 
Petitioner, 
-and-
TOWN OF EASTCHESTER, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Town of Eastchester Police Officers Union, 
Inc. has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-
named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as 
their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
CASE NO. C-5405 
Certification - C-5405 - 2 -
Included: All full-time patrol officers, sergeants and detectives. 
Excluded: Chief of Police and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Town of Eastchester Police Officers Union, Inc. The duty 
to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 30, 2004 
Albany, New York 
6'1/^uduJiJ / / y i 
" ^ 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ John T. Mitchell, Member u 
) 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SMITHTOWN SECURITY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
— .._... Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5401 
SMITHTOWN CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Smithtown Security Employees Association 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C- - 2 -
Included: All Guards who worked 370 hours per year or more during the 
2003-2004 school year and who, after the date of certification, work 
40 hours per month or more. 
Excluded: All others. 
FUBIHER, ITJSJDRD^^^ 
negotiate collectively with the Smithtown Security Employees Association. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 30, 2004 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
iohh T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SAVANNAH HIGHWAY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
- —- Petitioner, 
-and-
TOWN OF SAVANNAH, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
\ A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Savannah Highway Employees Association 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
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Included: Highway Department Motor Equipment Operators. 
Excluded: All others, including Deputy Highway Superintendent. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
jiegotiate^jD|Lei:iiyely wiih^t 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 30, 2004 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ohln T. Mitchell, Member 
